In February 2020, after months of electoral disputes and vote recounts, the 2019 Afghan election results were announced. Incumbent Ashraf Ghani was re-elected and took the presidential oath: however, his opponent, Abdullah Abdullah, did as well. This presidential crisis highlights the development issues impacting Afghanistan in the post-Taliban period, raising questions of whether the country is prepared for a democratic transition, how to manage widespread corruption, and the role of civil society in Afghanistan.

These challenges are not new to Afghanistan. In response to them, Counterpart International established the Afghan Civic Engagement Program (ACEP), which ran from 2013-2020, to strengthen civil society, improve voter education, increase government accountability, and empower disadvantaged groups within Afghan society. ACEP implemented a youth empowerment program which helps young people become involved in civil society and prepares them to engage in the democracy-building process.

Youth in Afghanistan have experienced  a range of  challenges in the post-conflict period, including limited access to education, high unemployment, and lack of political voice. As a result, youth have become a target of recruitment efforts by extremist groups. This vulnerability, combined with Afghanistan’s struggles for good governance and sustainable civil society, makes youth an important demographic to reach. ACEP sought to increase youth’s involvement in the key decision-making processes of government and civil society so that they can have the voice previously denied to them and help improve their country. ACEP strives to reach this goal through its Emerging Civil Society Leaders (ECSL) program including international study trips.

Our research

We analyzed the ECSL program in an effort to assess the extent to which it succeeded in promoting the voices of marginalized groups within Afghanistan. We also viewed the program through the critical lens of participation in development provided by The Development Dictionary, by Majid Rahnema. We found that, while the ESCL program is successful in promoting a few marginalized voices, it required additional focus on guaranteeing the inclusion of marginalized groups on an intersectional level.

International development organizations, Afghan civil society organizations, and ultimately the Afghan government, are the key stakeholders in youth participation in Afghan civil society. Many organizations, including Counterpart, are making substantial efforts to incorporate the voices traditionally missing from decision-making, such as youth and women. For example:

• The Youth Empowerment Project (YEP), spearheaded by the United Nations Human Settlement Program and completed in 2009, aimed to involve youth in the economic, social and cultural life of their communities. Activities included training for youth coordinators, civic education, and foreign study visits, similar to those sponsored by Counterpart. This project’s collaborative nature included roles for government institutions, civil society organizations, and Afghan youth.
• United States Institute for Peace (USIP) and local partners in Afghanistan recently completed a project utilizing participatory theater to challenge cultural norms, prevent electoral violence, and emphasize youth participation and female representation. USIP is also currently running a Youth Advisory Council (YAC) that is competitively selected on an annual basis. The YAC engages youth leaders’ regional and thematic expertise to inform USIP’s broader research and programming.
• The Asia 21 Youth Leaders Initiative (AYLI), managed by the Asia Society, operates in sixteen countries including Afghanistan. While both AYLI and ACEP attempt to develop leadership skills in targeted youth populations with the hope of developing future leaders, the AYLI focuses on youth participation on an explicitly international level.

Strengthening Future Programming in Afghanistan

After reviewing the projects above and comparing them to ACEP, we found that they share a key missing element that needs to be addressed if future programs could better transform youth governance engagement in Afghanistan. Most importantly, we found all four projects lacked intentional strategies to deconstruct programmatic barriers and reach marginalized groups within the already disenfranchised Afghan youth population. In the context of Afghan history, in particular the recent period of the Taliban, the most marginalized groups have been women and religious minorities.

Notably, we identified that these programs have established systems that have, intentionally or not, excluded these groups. For example, the AYLI program often recruits people who are already in positions of leadership, and the YAC requires that potential participants go through an application process. Such systems tend to benefit those who are already privileged, including more resources to spend on an application process for such programs.

Ways to address barriers to entry are numerous; these programs could implement a quota system, setting up program components targeted for young women or other marginalized groups to overcome barriers to accessing leadership roles, or even targeted promotion of the programs and making them accessible in areas where predominately marginalized groups live. In addition, Counterpart could include activities in the future intended to promote collaboration between marginalized groups and those who come from a privileged background, such as many of the participants of ECSL program. The program could develop tools through which to facilitate interaction and discussion between the privileged and the marginalized, aiming to break-down existing barriers and power structures within the population of youth themselves. By taking such steps, programs would support a stage for marginalized youth voices to be heard and bring fresh ideas on how to face Afghanistan’s challenges. In turn, youth participation has the potential to increase the access by marginalized groups to decision-making processes to shape the future of the country. While breaking down intersectional marginalization in Afghanistan is a critical challenge, more intentional steps in this direction may prove fruitful. Ultimately, the various international programs would better achieve their goal of promoting the voices and impact of youth in decision-making. We recommend that future programs should more intentionally provide access to those who have not traditionally had a voice in Afghan politics and in the decision-making process.

This article is part of the “Next Generation in Thought Leadership” series - a partnership between the University of Dayton Human Rights Center, International Studies Program and Counterpart International. Students conduct applied research providing valuable research to countries in Counterpart’s program portfolio. 

In January 2019, national elections finally took place in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) after being postponed three times due to violence. Many citizens were suspicious of the electoral process and believed that there were miscalculations in the results. Such delays are not unprecedented. Since the DRC gained its independence from Belgium in 1960, the country has been politically unstable. This instability has negatively affected citizens’ ability to participate in free and fair elections. Those at a particular disadvantage include youth, specifically those under the age of 18, women, and people who live in militarized areas which do not have adequate government control or intervention.

Previous laws prohibited those under the age of 18 from voting.  Recently, the government determines voter eligibility using an old voter registry which does not account for the Congolese citizens who reached voting age after 2011.  Moreover, in many parts of the country, the youth are uneducated and unemployed without access to civic and voter education. In addition, women aren’t encouraged to take part in political activities in the DRC as a result of inequalities in access and continuing cultural barriers to women in decision-making.

Our research

We evaluated Counterpart International’s Promoting Increased Civic Engagement in the Lead-up to Elections in the Democratic Republic of Congo (PRICE) program in the DRC by reviewing similar development projects from different organizations to better analyze the program. We also studied Counterpart’s Inclusive Social Accountability (ISA) method. The method is grounded on local ownership and communities to ensure long-term impact through the three components of partnerships, inclusion, and flexibility.

PRICE supports local civil society organizations (CSOs) with the aim of ensuring the participation of the youth in the electoral and governance processes. The program supports CSOs with necessary information about the new electoral legislation, voter registration, and new voting technology. A key component of the project is a collaboration with local CSOs, international non-governmental development organizations, and the Commission Electorale Nationale Indépendante (CENI) to create gender and social inclusion training that promotes the direct participation of women and ensures gender inclusivity in civic and voter education materials.

In addition, PRICE involves youth and women in public forums, and many social activities targeted at engaging and allowing these groups to be heard. PRICE gives them tools to better understand the electoral process, such as educating marginalized groups about the requirements of the registration process, and providing examples of peaceful voting processes, especially for the youth. PRICE youth activities involve competitions, as well as messaging about peaceful protest and conflict resolution to address the violence that erupts during protests and promote knowledge of citizens on how to participate in conflict-free elections. The debates and competitions include activities like drawing democracy and peace in DRC, skits about peaceful elections, and questions/answer game school competitions.

Our findings

Based on our analysis, we found that the PRICE program has been successful, and in line with the ISA methodology. The program was able to give small grants and other resources to local CSOs and organizations. It implemented voter education campaigns, forums for youth and women, training for marginalized communities, workshops, technical assessments, and effective media campaigns. However, the PRICE program takes place in a challenging context. For people who live in highly militarized areas, it was difficult for Counterpart to reach them due to fighting between militia groups and government troops. In addition, the government has consistently suppressed the exchange of information and independent reporting, by shutting down the internet and stopping text messaging, which negatively impacts PRICE activities.

We also identified that PRICE should increase its focus on becoming more inclusive of young people from different backgrounds and gender. This would better support the grantees in the conflict-affected and militarized regions of the DRC. Small grants and resource support, such as toolkits, should be tailored specifically to the many DRC regions and to specific marginalized groups. Stakeholders should be included in the development of different resources or tool kits that Counterpart distributes to CSOs and local partners on the ground. Changes to toolkits and activities could center around gender inclusivity in the context of the youth, participation in electoral and governance processes at local and regional levels (not just national), provision of examples of the impact of voting and when youth voice is heard. We found that while the PRICE tools explain democracy sufficiently, more resources could focus on providing the citizens with clear “how-to” guidance to promote democracy locally.

Through our research, we have learned about the many challenges that come with implementing development projects in countries with low voter turnout among the youth and women. We now understand the importance of partnerships, inclusion, and flexibility as key approaches and we found these unique to Counterpart in comparison with its peer organizations. We believe that having a framework like ISA is essential for establishing sustainable relationships between the local community and CSOs.

This article is part of the “Next Generation in Thought Leadership” series - a partnership between the University of Dayton Human Rights Center, International Studies Program and Counterpart International. Students conduct applied research providing valuable research to countries in Counterpart’s program portfolio. 

Lebanon is currently facing one of the country’s worst economic crises in decades. Civilians around the country are taking a stand to hold the government accountable for years of mismanagement, corruption, and poor leadership. Unemployment rates are rising, the value of the Lebanese Pound is decreasing, and the country’s debt-to-GDP ratio currently stands at 150%. Recent changes in the government are also galvanizing civilians to respond. In January 2020, the Lebanese government appointed Hassan Diab as Prime Minister, along with a new cabinet. Both of these appointments are strongly supported by Hezbollah, a Shiite Muslim political and militant group, which causes tensions with non-Shiite religious populations in the country. Lebanon hosts diverse religious groups, including Sunni Muslims, Shia Muslims, Druze, and various Christian denominations; religion plays an important role in the governance structure of the country. 

Lebanon’s current economic situation and its weak governance have inspired a number of civil society actors to advocate for a wide range of development issues. These include lack of municipal transparency, lack of political representation, public service mismanagement, lack of monitoring of public spending, and insufficient taxation laws. However, the challenges are not just related to the government. Civil society organizations (CSOs) struggle with capacity gaps which hinder them in properly addressing local issues, catering to the society’s needs, and providing the needed services.

Counterpart International and Management Systems International partnered with local CSOs in Lebanon to help in building their capacity and organizational development through its Building Alliances for Local Advancement, and Investment—Capacity Building (BALADI CAP) project. This 6-year development project, launched in 2013 and funded by USAID, aimed to support CSOs in filling service delivery gaps, advancing rights of vulnerable populations, and advocating for reform.

Our Research

Our research evaluated the extent to which the BALADI CAP promoted good governance and accountability. We looked specifically at the four stages of the Capacity Building Component (CBC) and the Civic Engagement Initiative (CEI) components implemented by Management Systems International, a leading consulting firm with niche expertise in international development and other sectors.

In the first stage of the CBC, 51 partnering CSOs were assessed using the Organizational Capacity Assessment (OCA) tool for their organizational health in the areas of strategic planning, financial systems, monitoring and evaluation (M&E), and human resources. In the second stage, the project developed tailored action plans for specific CSOs by setting performance improvement goals. CSOs capacity is strengthened to enable them to access small grants under the Fixed Amount Award (FAA) contractual agreement(s) aimed to facilitate disbursement of grant funding. In the third stage, the project delivered 132 training workshops tailored uniquely to each CSO eschewing the “one size fits all” approach. The fourth and last stage involves measuring improvements in the CSO’s performance by using the initial OCA assessments as a baseline guide to their progress made in organizational health. This process is repeated annually to measure organizational change and progress.

The CEI component aims to build capacity of non-political and non-religious affiliated CSOs in order to strengthen civic culture and increase democratic and inclusive governance by Lebanese citizens. The component created platforms for informed public debate and the free competition of ideas around priority issues, outside of sectarian and confessional lines. Specifically, it involved three reinforcing activities: 

1. Networks and coalitions connecting urban and rural CSOs to address power imbalances and bring national and local stakeholders together; 
2. Facilitation of CSO partnerships and capacity building of one or more Intermediary Service Organizations (ISOs), which connect smaller organizations and the people they serve to the local delivery system and mediate between foreign funding agencies and local government agencies or community organizations;
3. Creation of local problem-solving groups around pre-identified critical areas  (“issue networks”).

Findings

In our analysis, we found shared and interdependent limitations in both components of the BALADI CAP. First, the CBC and CEI suffered from limited participation and training exhaustion of CSOs due to the time demanded from the participants. CSOs with few to no staff had trouble fully participating in the training and workshops and were disadvantaged as a result. In addition, the FAA contractual agreement(s) were extended prior to the formation of the CSO networks and thus meeting this benchmark for CSOs did not align with nor contribute to the network objectives.

To address this challenge, we recommend a staged approach to building capacity and network building which starts with time and financial management, and minimizes at least initially, the need for participation in trainings and workshops including in relation to coalition building. Sequencing activities differently might have a better impact on the smaller CSOs, catering more to their capacity needs before they are expected to participate in the activity of forming coalitions. To start, priority could be given to work on time management and FAA agreements, beginning with the financial and human resource aspects of individual CSOs and ISOs to develop them to the point where they are strong and sustainable enough to receive funding. As these CSOs develop financial sustainability, grow in staff, and specialize in their units they will be able to adequately define roles as it relates to coalitions and have enough staff to send to training. This would increase performance and ability to form different clusters of CSOs based on shared service and advocacy themes. In relation to network effectiveness, we also noted that it is important to ensure CSOs remain neutral on religious matters so that their work is not hindered because of politicization.

Conducting this research was a new task for us and stretched our capacity beyond our comfort zone. We gained a new perspective on how funding for civil society can create coalitions around important advocacy issues, and how essential it is to give humans a voice how needs can be met. We also now appreciate how much work goes on behind the scenes in civil society in order to make an impact in the community.

This article is part of the “Next Generation in Thought Leadership” series - a partnership between the University of Dayton Human Rights Center, International Studies Program and Counterpart International. Students conduct applied research providing valuable research to countries in Counterpart’s program portfolio. 

Zambia suffers from historically high levels of corruption that translate to inequitable governance. Civil society organizations (CSOs) play a crucial role in disrupting these systemic barriers to equity. The government is ineffective in providing quality education and adequate health services, which exponentially impacts marginalized communities. These communities include, but are not limited to, women, children, and individuals diagnosed with HIV/AIDS. In Zambia, international NGOs such as Counterpart International help to strengthen civic engagement and demand for  greater transparency and accountability of government service providers. 

Counterpart International’s project, Fostering Accountability and Transparency in Zambia (FACT Zambia), funded by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), aims to improve the capacity of local CSOs to expand their community outreach, impact, and engagement among all stakeholders, including local governments, businesses, and community members. Specifically, FACT Zambia seeks to increase engagement between CSOs and government service providers by promoting inclusive networks amongst local CSOs, historically vulnerable communities, and state officials. It  provides adequate resources, in terms of funding and guidance, for CSOs to effectively collaborate with the government to improve sustainable livelihoods, support communities impacted by extractive industries, and increase climate resiliency.

What works

We looked at FACT Zambia from the perspective of Counterpart International’s own methodology,  Inclusive Social Accountability (ISA). We kept asking ourselves the same question: Is FACT Zambia creating sustainable impact that leads CSOs to establish self-sufficient, accountable, and inclusive partnerships that create systemic change?

We found that dismantling and deconstructing the current relationships between state and civil society in Zambia is a complex issue, requiring substantial social, financial, and structural support to strengthen the capacity for collective action. The project reached thousands of individuals in multiple, diverse ways. We identified one of the most successful impacts came from the creation and implementation of the Social Accountability Symposium (SAS). In addition to funding the project, USAID co-sponsored the SAS with the United Kingdom Department for International Development (DFID). This public dialogue aims to create a formal space for marginalized citizens to voice their ideas about how to improve public services in education, healthcare, HIV/AIDS treatments, and building sustainable livelihoods. The SAS engaged high level government actors; the Secretary of the National Development Plan (NDP), Chola Chabala, participated in the symposium, emphasizing how the NDP will strengthen social accountability to increase citizen participation.

Having a formal dialogue space increases citizens’ power and hope for collective change. The SAS demonstrated that strengthening the relationship between citizens and state authorities is possible. It also highlighted that exchange of ideas about the needs of the marginalized communities was required and desired in Zambia.

Our recommendations

FACT Zambia created programs and partnerships that generated change. Ultimately, we found, however, that the project fell short of creating a long-term impact in which local CSOs develop self-reliance and transparent sustainable relationships with stakeholders in the public, private, and state realms. To address this, we provide topical recommendations below:

First, FACT Zambia should bolster its comprehensive management of information that fosters community sensitization and transparency to address inadequacies, and contribute to consistent interactions between service-providers and service-users. One tactic could be to share outward-facing quarterly reports with local CSOs in order to address any mistrust and misinformation about Counterpart International’s role in civic engagement.

Second, FACT Zambia should operationalize local knowledge and partner organizations with local donors who have more stake in sustaining relevant and locally supported projects in Zambia. Such an approach would deepen the ties with local stakeholders reinforcing the suitability of the work in response to the conditions in the country.

Third, we believe that when CSOs recognize their unique roles, they are better able to identify their needs and value more collaboration with diverse stakeholders. More attention could be given by the project to help each CSO to clearly define and identify its role in relation to others, thereby increasing productivity within their capacities and resources. Counterpart International could help foster relationships and partnerships between local CSOs by connecting individuals and groups that share similar missions or work within the same sector to exchange tools, knowledge, and resources through an online platform that can connect CSOs across the country.

Finally, though the ISA methodology is geared towards development that benefits marginalized persons, the project did not sufficiently reach women, children, and those diagnosed with HIV/AIDS in Zambia. We suggest that the project have intentionally designed components to benefit marginalized communities by helping to address the inequities that they experience. This could involve supporting grassroots CSOs from marginalized communities as much as possible to provide more services to these groups and create spaces where these marginalized groups can be heard and influence the direction of project services. Ultimately, expanding this dimension would increase the depth of civic engagement, combat inequities, enhance the effectiveness of the project, and increase stakeholder awareness and trust.

Conclusion

This research gave us a chance to learn about the challenges that international NGOs face in a country where citizens are not highly engaged in civil society and struggle with working towards collective action and change. FACT Zambia challenged us to think about what barriers are in place that may keep citizens from taking an active role in their local government structures and how these barriers can be deconstructed in order to reach towards a more equitable society.

This article is part of the “Next Generation in Thought Leadership” series - a partnership between the University of Dayton Human Rights Center, International Studies Program and Counterpart International. Students conduct applied research providing valuable research to countries in Counterpart’s program portfolio.